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Abstract
The current, highly centralized approach to fi sheries management seems to be incapable of coping with 
escalating resource depletion and environmental degradation. Co-management has been identifi ed as 
an alternative. This paper compares various approaches to fi sheries management and discusses their 
performance in relation to the nature of the fi shery. It is concluded that in African fi sheries, stringent 
institutional arrangements, poor human, technical and fi nancial resources, and a limited time frame 
often thwart co-management approaches. However, with the right conditions and prerequisites, co-
management can be successful in improving compliance with regulations and maintaining or enhancing 
the quality of the resource. The paper brings out the issues that require further research.
Introduction
As in many parts of the world, over-
exploitation of fi sheries is common in 
Africa. Traditionally, fi shery management was 
entrusted to community leadership, typically 
a Chief working with the support of a council 
of elders. The fi shery resource was often 
perceived as a gift from nature or various 
deities who made their wishes known through 
the elders. Rituals and sacrifi ces were often 
associated with traditional African fi sheries 
management.
Ownership and access to the resource 
was communal. Family members inherit the 
resource and access is granted by kinship. 
Fishing communities have strong social and 
religious values with ethics and norms, which 
creates room for collective communal co-
operation. Participation in such traditional 
institutions is often based on age and gender. 
Women, for example, are typically involved in 
fi sh processing and marketing.  Adult men fi sh 
while older men spearhead decision-making 
based on their experience and knowledge. 
Youths are mostly involved in communal 
development projects.
Traditional management measures widely 
employed in African fi sheries include, inter alia:
• Forbidding of fi shing in certain areas.
• Closed days or seasons.
• Restrictions on fi shing gears or techniques.
• Limiting access.
Offenders are punished through sanctions, 
fi nes or expulsion from the community. Such 
management practices seem to have worked 
well mostly because of strong group cohesion, 
emphasis on social obligations, consensus-
based decision making and a high degree of 
social conformity (Horemans and Jallow 2000). 
Recently, these systems have been weakened 
by the erosion of traditional beliefs, disrespect 
for elders and the disintegration of social 
structures as a result of urbanization.
Since colonial times, centralized institutions have 
been in place to increase government control 
over resources. Policies are usually embodied 
in a Fisheries Act, Decree or Master Plan, which 
defi nes the authority and administration for 
management. The Department of Fisheries, in 
consultation with scientists, extension agents, 
community representatives and/or donor 
agencies, formulates policy and legislation. 
Fishery regulations mostly take the form of:
• Effort regulation (total allowable catch, 
limited fl eet size etc.);
• Technical regulation (mesh size restrictions, 
gear specifi cations);
• Entry limitations (permits, licenses etc.); 
and
• Monitoring and surveillance (confi scation, 
fi nes, etc.).
The success of such centralized planning and 
regulation depends upon a government’s ability 
to correctly analyze problems and enforce its 
will. Unfortunately, inadequate infrastructure, 
expertise and funding have resulted in: 1) 
a serious lack of data upon which to base 
effective policy and 2) the inability to enforce 
regulations. Together, these problems have 
rendered most modern fi shery management 
policies meaningless. In many African countries, 
increased community involvement through 
co-management programs is being seen as a 
potential solution to this problem.
Fisheries co-management is the sharing of 
responsibility and cost for the sustainable 
management of a fi shery between the 
government and the local community (Berkes 
et al. 1991; West and Brechin 1991; Pomeroy 
and Williams 1994; Jentoft and McCay 1995; 
Borrini-Feyerabend 1996; Raakjaer Nielsen 
et al. 1996; Sen and Raakjaer Nielsen 1996; 
Kuperan et al. 1998; Schreiber 2001; Hara 
et al. 2002). The concept of co-management 
is now synonymous with co-operative 
management, community based management, 
joint management and/or participatory 
management, but should not be confused with 
cooperative fi sheries management which aims 
to establish coordinated joint management 
programs between states (Munro 1987, 2002). 
The key objective of co-management is the 
development of a strategy for collaborative 
decision-making that can lead to agreement 
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on management roles and responsibilities 
that generate local incentives for sustainable 
resource use (Hara 1999).
Co-Management in Africa
The basic challenge of co-management 
is the reshaping of government thinking 
to institutionalize collaboration between 
administration and resource users in order 
to end unproductive situations where they 
are pitted against one another as antagonistic 
actors (Baland and Platteau 1996). Devolution 
of some authority to manage fi sheries away 
from central administrations to user groups 
may be one of the most diffi cult tasks of co-
management (Raakjaer Nielsen et al. 1996). 
Government resource managers are often 
reluctant to share their authority or even 
part of it (Kuperan et al. 1998). Allowing fi sh 
harvesters to manage fi sheries is felt to be 
almost as sensible as turning the hen house 
over to the fox, with harvesters lacking both 
the necessary knowledge about resources 
and capability of reaching consensus (Davies 
and Jentoft 2001). Population increases in 
fi shing communities, market integration and 
technological innovations in gear and crafts 
as well as corruption and other patterns of 
human behavior can undermine co-management 
arrangements (McCay and Jentoft 1996). In 
addition, co-management is associated with 
high program design costs necessary to ensure 
effective participation (Hanna 1995) and these 
may outweigh the expected benefi ts (Kuperan 
et al. 1998).
On the other hand, long-term costs for 
monitoring and enforcement are low (Hanna 
1995) as many recurring costs to government, 
such as patrols, record keeping and facilities 
maintenance, can be shifted from the central 
government to user groups. In addition, user 
participation draws upon the experience and 
expertise of fi shers and increases the likelihood 
of compliance with rules and regulations 
(Jentoft 1989; Jentoft and McCay 1995). The 
institution of co-management regimes has 
reportedly helped strengthen small-scale fi shing 
communities by increasing community cohesion 
and an elevation of pride in cultural identity and 
optimism about the future (McGoodwin 2001). 
To look at how the various costs and benefi ts of 
co-management might add up in Africa, nine case 
studies were selected, representing a range of 
both inland and marine co-management systems.
Benin: Lake Nokoue (Atti-Mama 
1997) 
The fi shing site covers an area of about 12 000 
ha, with a fi shing population of 13 500. Many 
types of fi shing gears are employed to catch 
a wide variety of fi sh species. Access to the 
resource is communal with poor compliance 
with regulations from the users. Lack of fi shery 
data, high fi shing pressure, and poor enforcement 
are the main management problems. The 
Department of Fisheries and the Center for 
Regional Rural Development administer fi shery 
regulations with the local administration (Sous 
Prefet). The formation of fi shery committees 
with the local fi shermen, in consultation with 
the formal institutions, strengthened resource 
use and management. One of the paramount 
benefi ts of co-management in lake Nokoue was 
the sensitization program, aimed at training and 
education of fi shers in the principles of fi shery 
management. This has yielded better compliance 
with fi shery regulations, and improved 
sustainability of the fi shery.
Cote d’Ivoire: Aby Lagoon Complex 
(Kponhassia and Konan 1997)
This is a multi-species and multi-gear coastal 
fi shery with a population of approximately 
3 000 fi shers. The Lagoon complex extends 
over an area of 424 km2, which is a common 
property with territorial rights limiting access 
to certain areas. Fishing boats are 8 to 12m 
long but poorly mechanized. This is a low value 
fi shery, targeting species with a variable market, 
but generally low market value. Confl icts over 
access rights are common. High fi shing pressure 
and lack of reliable stock assessment are other 
key problems. The Directorate of Fisheries 
in partnership with the local administration 
(Government appointed Sous Prefet) has tried 
to regulate the high fi shing pressure on the 
resource. A co-management structure, the 
Consultative Fishery Surveillance Committee, 
has been empowered to regulate and enforce 
government policies. Education and sensitization 
programs for greater user participation have 
been organized and have led to improved 
compliance and resource conservation.
The Gambia: Central River Division 
(Njie and Mikkola 2002)
This is a multi-gear and multi-species riverine 
fi shery on the Gambia River used by 314 
poorly mechanized fi shers. There is a high 
infl ux of migrant and foreign fi shermen with 
indiscriminate gear use and consequent 
environmental degradation. Human and 
technical constraints are evident, with 
inaccessibility of landing sites being a key 
management problem. The Department 
of Fisheries in consultation with the local 
traditional authority (village head and council 
of elders) and local Community Fisheries 
Management Committees devised a number 
of co-management approaches to common 
problems, which include the lack of fi shery data, 
poor implementation of Government policies, 
weak enforcement of rules, and confl icts 
among resource users. Since the advent of co-
management, there is greater user participation 
and better enforcement. Participatory control 
and surveillance has improved resource 
conservation as have the implementation of 
new seasonal and area closures.
Malawi: Lake Malombe (Donda 1996)
This is a multi-gear and multi-species fi shery, 
with an area of about 390 km2 and with a 
fi shing population of about 2 300 and open 
access rights with low mechanization within 
the industry. Input cost is rather high, with a 
variable market structure, and poor technical 
facilities for fi sh processing and transportation 
of fi sh products. Management challenges 
include unregulated access, limited control 
and monitoring by the regulatory authority 
and over exploitation. The Department of 
Fisheries administers fi shery regulations and 
has, in consultation with the local village 
authority and fi sher associations, developed 
a co-management approach. Entry and gear 
restrictions have now been implemented, 
along with seasonal closures. Co-management 
has generally led to better compliance from 
resource users and greater participation.
Mozambique: Angoche District in 
Nampula Province (Lopes et al. 1997)
This is a multi-gear and multi-species coastal 
marine fi shery with a surface area of 3 600 km2 
and a fi shing population about 200 000. 
Although the fi shery is poorly mechanized, the 
open access and common property nature of 
the resource makes it highly susceptible to 
over-exploitation. Moreover, the lack of 
alternate job activities within the community 
has been steadily increasing the number of 
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fi shers and confl ict among them is increasing. 
Poor processing and other marketing 
infrastructure limit the profi tability of the 
fi shery. From the point of view of management, 
stock assessment, regulation of effort and over-
exploitation are key problems. The Marine 
Fisheries Administration, the Ministry of Finance 
and the Fisheries Secretariat undertake fi shery 
management and regulation. This top-down 
structure has been strengthened through 
consultation with traditional local authorities 
and a council of Chiefs together with communal 
associations (Guias de Pesca) to co-manage the 
fi shery. Consultative committees from both 
formal and informal institutions have been 
formed to address common fi sheries problems 
and to manage the fi shery resource in terms of 
regulation and encouraging compliance by users.
Nigeria: Lake Chad (Nieland 2000)
This is a mono-gear (basket) fi shery with entry 
restrictions. Consequently, the fi shery yields 
high catches and profi ts per unit area. However, 
high fi shing pressure, poor fi shery data, 
unclear property rights, and environmental 
degradation are increasingly common 
problems. The Department of Fisheries, 
together with traditional authorities have 
formed a Monitoring Unit that seeks to ensure 
compliance with management measures aimed 
at guaranteeing sustainability. User participation 
has increased, but capacity building and better 
legal structures are still required.
South Africa: Arniston (Hutton and 
Lamberth 1997)
This is another multi-gear, multi-species coastal 
marine fi shery with a moderate level of boat 
mechanization. The biggest issue here is racial 
segregation and the absence of harbors. 
Confl icts are common, with illegitimate rules 
and fi shery regulations left over from the 
Apartheid era. A Sea Fisheries Committee 
oversees fi shery management and regulations 
under the Ministry of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism. One of the greatest challenges is 
competition between industrial and artisanal 
fi sheries, leading to high fi shing pressure 
and problems with control and monitoring. 
However, consultations within the local fi sher’s 
forum, and amongst the local Communal Trust 
and the Sea Fisheries Committee have yielded 
fruits in a joint co-management approach. 
One of the most important outcomes of this 
has been the formation of co-operatives and 
communal organizations with a high degree of 
participation and legitimacy, which has been 
able to enforce fi shery regulations and the 
increase the sustainability of resource use.
Zambia: Lake Kariba (Sen et al. 1997)
Lake Kariba is one of the largest man-made 
lakes in the world with 5 500 km2 surface area, 
300 km long and 40 km at its widest point. It 
is a multi-gear and multi-species fi shery with 
open access, although preference is given to 
certain ethnic groups like Valley Tonga people. 
The fi shermen often have confl ict with other 
non-fi shing resource users like Safari operators 
and illegal cross-border traders. This, coupled 
with a variable market structure, post harvest 
spoilage and poor returns, make risky the high 
investment costs. Multiple and destructive 
fi shing gears like explosives, chemicals, poisons, 
jigging and illegal size nets have the potential to 
overexploit the resource. The lack of reliable 
catch and effort data thwarts management 
initiatives. The Department of Fisheries 
regulatory structure has been enhanced with 
local traditional institutions and committees 
in a joint participatory and consultative 
approach that has reduced confl ict. In addition, 
more consultation and participation on the 
part of the resource users has led to better 
compliance with regulations.
Zimbabwe: Lake Kariba (Sen et al. 
1997)
As is the case for the Zambian part of the 
lake, the Zimbabwe fi shery on Lake Kariba 
is a multi-user resource, with the fi shermen 
competing with other users for access. The 
fi shing population is about 1 240 with a 
form of government regulated access, but 
confl icts are common with other stakeholders. 
The fi shery is poorly mechanized, with low 
economic returns, large post harvest spoilage 
and fi xed market prices. One company 
is the largest single buyer and, therefore, 
practically determines the price of fresh fi sh. 
The company often provides fi shers with nets 
and some foodstuff on credit. Repayments 
are usually made with fi sh. Fishing is generally 
regarded as risky due to the presence of 
game scouts, crocodiles and hippos. The use 
of destructive fi shing gear and a high fi shing 
effort is unsustainable. This is compounded 
by unreliable fi shery data. The Department of 
Fisheries, Parks and Wildlife, in consultation 
with the Lake Kariba Fisheries Research 
Institute, is responsible for administering 
fi shery regulations. Together with traditional 
local authority and fi shery development 
committees, a new co-management approach 
has led to the formation of exclusive fi shing 
zones and closures and has gone a long way in 
resource conservation. There is now greater 
user participation, with trust and cooperation 
between the resource users and the fi shery 
offi cers, which has lead to legitimacy and 
compliance with fi shery regulations.
Analysis of Case Studies
The case studies represent typical African 
fi sheries in that they are generally multi-species 
and use a range of gear types. Motorized boats 
are rare. Tenure is mostly common property 
and open access, with consequent confl icts 
between traditional and new users displaced 
by poverty into fi shing. Resource over-
exploitation, lack of respect for management 
decisions and environmental degradation are 
other common problems.
From these cases, several common 
denominators that have engendered successful 
outcomes can be identifi ed. These should be 
considered as key elements that any effort at 
sustainable co-management of African fi sheries 
needs to consider:
• Participation: The legitimization of laws 
and the harmonization of traditional and 
colonial enforcement systems through 
active participation by all resource users.
• Management: The provision of adequate 
fi nancial, technical and intellectual 
resources to make, explain and enforce 
regulations.
• Transparency: An honest willingness on 
the part of governments to relinquish 
exclusive control of natural resources and 
the establishment of trust and confi dence 
among the various partners.
Participation
A key aspect of successful management involves 
the delegation of managerial responsibility 
to traditional fi shery institutions with active 
participation by fi shers. This process has 
variously led to the formation of consultative 
committees, sensitization programs on resource 
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sustainability, control and surveillance systems 
and confl ict resolution entities. In many 
cases, this emphasis on user involvement has 
necessitated education and other capacity 
building initiatives so as to enhance effective 
participation and consultation.
Traditional property rights, customary laws 
and agreements in African fi sheries dictate 
access, ownership, seasonality or fi shing hours, 
permitted gear types and penalties for breaking 
the rules. Such customary tenure systems 
work best where ownership is limited and 
clearly defi ned. Within offshore or open-access 
fi sheries, migratory (non-indigenous) fi shers 
often make local laws diffi cult to enforce.
The establishment of local informal 
organizations within fi shing communities goes 
a long way to institutionalize local participation. 
These organizations, associations or co-
operatives tend to build up a sense of solidarity 
and trust. For successful co-management, such 
local institutions should be strengthened where 
they exist, and new ones created where they 
are non-existent. These social structures are 
essential in communal integration, consensus 
decision making and as a body to which 
management responsibility can be delegated.
Management
The size of the resource and the number of 
fi shers or other resource users is a critical 
component of success. Among the cases 
reviewed, success tends to be easier to achieve 
in inland fi sheries and small waterbodies. 
In effect, the smaller the water body, the 
more likely that co-management will work. 
A major part of this success is the ability to 
capture suffi cient biological data to enable 
the formulation of effi cacious management 
strategies.
Fishing communities are composed of 
households and family units with complicated 
kinship relationships being a crucial factor in 
access to resources. In small homogenous 
communities, cohesion and effective 
communication can help build consensus. 
Heterogeneous communities need to respect 
different ethnic, religious and social values 
so as to foster harmony. Fishery managers 
should take into consideration overlapping 
communities with reference to priorities 
and resource use. States can help to enforce 
communal property rights by facilitating co-
operation within and among communities.
Poor allocation of fi nancial resources causes 
lack of compliance and poor user participation 
in management. The increased sense of 
ownership within fi shing communities makes 
monitoring easier as the resource is seen 
as a personal property thereby increasing 
on compliance and sustainability. However, 
government cannot pass on to communities all 
the responsibility for data collection, analysis, 
formulation of regulations and enforcement 
without also providing some funds to support 
their work.
Relevant skills in fi sheries biology and ecology, 
fi sh processing, marketing and other business 
skills are essential for successful management. 
Training of local institutions and users in 
confl ict resolution, consensus building and 
resource use are also helpful.
Transparency
Successful collaboration between the state and 
local resource users requires trust, credibility 
and reliability. Central government must be 
fl exible, both with respect to occasional lapses 
on the part of communities and in the develop-
ment of creative means of enforcement that 
take local cultural values into consideration.
Co-management requires incentives for users 
to participate effectively. Such incentives can 
be social, economic or communal. Commu-
nity development quotas can be instrumental, 
particularly within societies where communities 
lose benefi ts to other stakeholders.
The role of the government in establish-
ing conditions for co-management is crucial, 
particularly in the creation of legitimacy and 
accountability for institutional arrangements 
and the delineation of power sharing and deci-
sion-making.
Institutions should be respected, with stake-
holders having the confi dence to trust their 
opinions. It is important that local institutions 
be empowered and enlightened as to their func-
tion, rights and responsibilities, membership and 
organizational arrangements. Good local leader-
ship, which has the respect and trust of the 
locals, and is able to create consensus around 
key decisions, can play an important role.
Conclusion
There is no single model or formula for the 
successful implementation of fi sheries co-
management. It depends to a large extent on 
the extent to which limiting factors can be 
overcome and the willingness of institutions 
to harmonize their activities. Local users, 
through education and empowerment, can 
act responsibly in resource use. However, 
sustained funding and the willingness to 
co-operate and participate in power sharing, 
despite discords or other limiting factors, are 
crucial to success.
Before undertaking a co-management initiative, 
there is a need to carefully examine the 
feasibility of various approaches as different 
African states may respond quite differently to 
such arrangements. Exactly how the sharing of 
rights and responsibilities can be negotiated 
will vary from place to place.
Future research should target institutional 
arrangements at the government and local 
levels, capacity building of the local resource 
users, the development of trust and confi dence 
between the actors, and determine rights and 
rules to govern users. Questions that future 
research could target are:
• How long can the traditional beliefs, 
rules and authorities work in the modern 
society? 
• Has foreign aid altered fi sher’s perception 
of their role in management, thereby 
making it more diffi cult to implement co-
management programs?
• Would co-management still work 
under current conditions of high 
population densities and transient fi shing 
communities?
Answering these questions would go a 
long way towards setting the stage for co-
management approaches.
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